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Chattel Mortgages-Requisite of Filing-Effect of Actual
Notice.-The defendant, Wallerman, negotiated with the Auto
Service Sales Company for the purchase of a new automobile. By oral
agreement, the vendor Sales Company was to take Wallerman's car
to apply on the purchase price of the new car. Wallerman delivered
the certificate of title of his car endorsed in blank to the Sales Company but was to retain possession of his car until the new car was
delivered. When after two months the Sales Company failed to make
delivery, Wallerman purchased another new car from the Labutzke
Motor Sales and turned in his car as credit on the purchase price and
assigned his certificate of title, which was still in the hands of the
Sales Company, to the Labutzke Motor Sales. Prior to this transaction,
the Sales Company had executed a chattel mortgage and delivered the
certificate of title to Wallerman's car to the plaintiff, C. I. T. Corporation, but the mortgage was not recorded until after Wallerman had
closed the deal with the Labutzke Motor Sales. Wallerman and the
Labutzke Motor Sales had no knowledge of the existence of the
mortgage. The plaintiff, C. I. T. Corporation, sued Wallerman and the
Labutzke Motor Sales in replevin. The trial court held for the defendants and, on appeal, the supreme court, affirming the judgment, held,
first, that delivery of the certificate of title to the Sales Company did
not constitute delivery of possession of the car since, under the provisions of sec. 241.08, "possession must be actual, open, unequivocal,
exclusive and continuous" in order to constitute delivery of possession;
and secondly, that unrecorded chattel mortgages have no validity
against subsequent purchasers or mortgagees, "even though they have
actual notice of them." C. I. T. Corporation v. Wallerman, 242 Wis.
287, 7 N.W. (2d) 884 (1943).
So far as herein applicable, sec. 241.08, Stats., provides: "No mortgage of personal property shall be valid against any other person than
the parties thereto unless the possession of the mortgaged property be
delivered to and retained by the mortgagee or unless the mortgage or
a copy thereof be filed as provided in section 241.10, except when
otherwise directed in these statutes." The statement of the court that
an unrecorded chattel mortgage has no validity against subsequent purchasers or mortgagees who have actual notice is a well established
rule in this state. An early case so holding is Parroski v. Goldberg' in
which a chattel mortgage was executed upon horses. The mortgage was
not recorded in the proper county. The mortgagor sold the horses to a
third person who knew of the existence of the mortgage. The court
held that actual notice or even filing the mortgage in the wrong county
would not preserve the validity of the mortgage against a subsequent
180 Wis. 339, 50 N.W. 191 (1891).
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RECENT DECISIONS

purchaser. Many subsequent cases in Wisconsin have upheld this
2

ruling.

The reasoning of the Wisconsin court in holding rigidly to this rule
is that the statute admits of no possible judicial interpretation because
it is plain and unambiguous in itself. The law requires either delivery
of possession to the mortgagee or filing of the mortgage. One or the
other will suffice but one or the other is absolutely essential. In First
National Bank v. Biederman, supra, Chief Justice Winslow said: "The
idea of the statute doubtless is that it is better to have the statute certain and effective than it is to leave the question in each case to depend
on notice or good faith, and thus afford opportunity for conflicts in
oral testimony and offer a reward to active and fertile memories." The
Wisconsin rule, however, asserts the minority view, which appears to
3
have been upheld in only seven other states.
The majority rule is that an unfiled chattel mortgage or one lacking the legal requirements of original filing is valid against persons with
actual notice thereof. The jurisdictions which have adopted the majority rule have based it upon two principal grounds: first that the law
involving actual notice is so deeply imprinted -upon our system of
jurisprudence that it need not be included in the statute; and, secondly,
the statutes requiring filing of mortgages were primarily intended to
prevent fraud and such statutes should not be construed so as to allow
them to be used as a medium of fraud. The cases sustaining this view
are numerous. 4
The Wisconsin court while holding to a strict statutory construction, makes this observation in the Biederman Case, supra,: "It seems
unquestionable that our own filing statute makes sharp practice posDorbrook v. M. Rumely Co., 120 Wis. 36, 97 N.W. 493 (1903) ; First National
Bank v. Biederman, 149 Wis. 8, 134 N.W. 1132 (1912); Holak v. Southard,
182 Wis. 494, 196 N.W. 769 (1924) ; Baierl v. Riesenecker, 201 Wis. 454, 227
Wis. 9 (1929); Grahm v. Perry, 200 Wis. 211, 228 N.W. 135 (1929); In re
Baumgartner, 55 F. (2d) 1041; Underwood Co. v. Lucia, 202 Wis. 507, 232
N.W. 835 (1930)..
3Merchants & F. Bank v. Citizens Bank, 125 Ark. 131, 187 S.W. 650 (1916);
Trust Co. v. Puritan Laundry, 95 Conn. 172, 111 Atl. 149 (1920); Hayden v.
Russell, 119 Me. 38, 109 Atl. 485 (1920) ; Wilson v. Mulligan, 75 Mo. 41 (1881) ;
Simpson v. Harris, 21 Nev. 353, 31 Pac. 1009 (1893) ; Discount Corp. v. Landis
Motor Co., 109 N.C. 157, 129 S.E. 414 (1925) ; Copeland v. Benet, 10 Yerg.
355 (Tenn. 1837).
4 Smith v. Zurcher, 9 Ala. 208 (1846); Harms v. Silva, 91 Cal. 636, 27 Pac.
1088 (1891); Crane v. Chandler, 5 Col. 21 (1879); McLendon v. Ricks, 22
Ga. App. 15, 95 S.E. 471 (1918); Wertheimer v. Shutice, 202 Ia. 1140, 211
N.W. 568 (1927) ; Com. Loan & Mortgage Co. v. Jones, 124 Kan. 649, 261 Pac.
555 (1928); Holt v. Farmers Warehouse, 201 Ky. 184, 256 S.W. 6 (1923);
Eaton v. Tuson, 245 Mass. 218, 13 N.E. 488 (1887); Read v. Harner, 90 Mich.
152, 51 N.W. 207 (1892) ; St. Paul Title Ins. v. Berkey, 52 Minn. 497, 55 N.W.
60 (1893); Wagner v. Steffin, 38 Neb. 392, 56 N.W. 993 (1893); Patten v.
Moore, 32 N.H. 382 (1855); Sanger v. Eastwood, 19 Wend. 514 (N.Y. 1838);
Davidson v. Osborne, 151 App. Div. 474, 136 N.Y.S. 247 (1912); Smith v.
Simper, 15 Ohio C.C. 375, 8 Ohio C.D. 308 (1897); Blevins v. Graham, 72
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sible and enables one who has full notice of a previously unrecorded
mortgage to purchase property, or to take a mortgage thereon to
secure a preexisting debt or one presently created, with the deliberate
purpose of cutting off the unrecorded mortgage."
ANTHONY J. PALASZ.

Okla. 308, 182 Pac. 247; Ayre v. Hixon. 53 Or. 19, 133 Am. St. Rep. 819

(1908); Howard v. McPhail, 37 R.I. 21, 91 Atl. 12 (1914); Talmadge v.

Oliver, 14 S.C. 522 (1880).

